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Abstract. In this paper we extend the herding attacks for concatenated
hash functions, i.e., hash functions of the form h(x) = h1(x)||h2(x). Our
results actually apply a much larger set of hash functions. We show that
even when the compression function of h(·) can be written as two (or
more) data paths, where one data path is not affected by the second
(while the second may depend on the first), then the generalized herding
attack can be applied. This result along with Joux’s original observations
show that schemes that aim to improve the resistance of hash functions
against these attacks, must use diffusion between the various data paths.
Keywords: Concatenated hash functions, Multi-Collisions, Herding at-
tack.
1 Introduction
Most compression functions used in real life applications are iterated, i.e., iter-
ate a compression function that accepts a message blocks of a fixed size. The
Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is the most widely used transformation of cryp-
tographic secure compression functions into cryptographic hash functions [5,
13]. The construction suggests a simple transformation that maintains the col-
lision resistance property of the underlying compression function. For years it
was widely believed that the transformation maintains also the pre-image resis-
tance of the underlying compression function as well as the second pre-image
resistance.
However, in recent years, several counter examples for these beliefs were
suggested. The first evidence for this was the works of Dean [6]. Dean showed
that if fix-points of the compression function can be easily found, then second
pre-image attacks on Merkle-Damg˚ard hash functions can be mounted using
O(n · 2n/2) time and O(n · 2n/2) memory (where n is the chaining value and the
digest size). The attack uses expandable messages, i.e., messages that can be
⋆ This work was supported in part by the Concerted Research Action (GOA) Ambiorics
2005/11 of the Flemish Government and by the IAP Programme P6/26 BCRYPT
of the Belgian State (Belgian Science Policy).
expanded without changing their chaining value. A downside for Dean’s attack
is the fact that the original message and the second pre-image are both relatively
long messages (of length O(2n/2) blocks).
Another recent result on iterated hashing is the seminal work of Joux on
finding multi-collisions [9]. The method proposed by Joux is based on finding
a collision for each of the t blocks separately. Then, by combining any of the
possible colliding blocks, one can find 2t messages that are hashed to the same
value.1
Later, Kelsey and Schneier have shows that second pre-image attacks on long
messages can be mounted even when there are no easy to find fix-points [11].
Their improvement is based on replacing the need for fix-points with a generation
of an expandable message using Joux’s multi-collision attack.
These second pre-image attacks work in the environment of relatively long
messages. In [10], Kelsey and Kohno showed that using a simple pre-computation,
it is possible to reduce the time requirements of pre-image attacks (in some
sense) of relatively short messages, while keeping the time complexity of the
attack much below O(2n). The herding attack is a time-memory computational
trick that allows the attacker to commit to a digest value, and then produce a
message with the corresponding digest, even when the message has a prefix (of
limited length) dictated to the attacker by an outside source.
Besides finding multi-collision, Joux [9] has also analyzed the case of two (or
more) concatenated hashing, i.e., hash functions h(x) that can be written as
h(x) = h1(x)||h2(x). Joux showed that if h1(·) and h2(·) are iterative
2 then the
time complexity of finding collisions in h(·) is very close to the time complexity
of finding collisions in h1(·) or h2(·) (up to a linear factor which depends on the
lengths of the outputs of h1(·) and h2(·)). The same holds for the problem of
finding pre-images for this kind of hash functions.
In this work we extend the herding attacks to hash functions where the com-
pression function can be written as two (or more) data paths, such that one
data path is not affected by others, (but affects others). This follow the fact that
Joux’s multi-collision attack still succeeds for such functions. Along with Joux’s
prior results this is an important observation for hash function designers who
try to increase the security of hash functions without changing the compression
function. This can be done by adding data paths which interact between them-
selves (i.e., have several compression function calls for each message block). Such
a family of constructions is presented in [7] under the name 3C. While the paper
presenting the 3C family states that Joux’s multi-collision attack is easily scaled
to the 3C family, it claims that attacks which are built over this attack are not
expected to work.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe Joux’s multi-
collision attack and the attacks on concatenated hash functions along with the
2nd pre-image attack by Kelsey and Schneier and the Herding attack by Kelsey
1 We note that in [4] the same basic idea was used in a pre-image attack against a
special kind of hash function.
2 We note that even if only one of the hash functions is iterative Joux’s results hold.
2
and Kohno. In Section 3 we give the explicit algorithms of Joux’s for concate-
nation done inside the compression function from one data path to the others.
We follow to show the generalization of the herding attack to the same scenario
in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the paper.
2 Previous Work
The Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is the most common way to transform a com-
pression function C : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n into a hash function hC(·) [5,
13]. Throughout this paper n denotes the size of the chaining value, and m
denotes the block size for the compression function.
The message M is padded with its length (after additional padding to make
the message a multiple of the block size m after the final padding), and the
message is divided into blocks of m bits each, M = M1M2M3 . . . Mt. An ini-
tial chaining value h0 = IV ∈ {0, 1}
n is set for the hash function (also called
initialization vector) and the following process is repeated t times:
hi = C(hi−1, Mi)
The final ht is outputed as the hash value.
2.1 Joux’s Multi-Collisions Attack on Iterated Hash Functions
In [9] it was observed that finding multiple collisions in an iterated hash function
is not much harder than finding one collision. The key observation behind the
attack is the fact that in iterative hashing schemes, such as the Merkle-Damg˚ard,
it is possible to find a collision for each block, e.g., for any hi−1 finding Mi and
M∗i such that C(hi−1, Mi) = C(hi−1, M
∗
i ). Finding t such one block collisions
(each starting from the chaining value produced by the previous block collision)
it is possible to construct 2t messages with the same hash value by selecting for
the ith block of the message either Mi or M
∗
i .
2.2 Joux’s Collision Attack on Concatenated Hash Functions
Joux’s multi-collision attack can be used to attack concatenated hash functions,
i.e., h(x) = h1(x)||h2(x). Such hash functions are as secure against collision
attacks and pre-image attacks as the stronger of the two underlying hash func-
tions.3 Let n1 and n2 be the chaining value lengths of h1(·) and h2(·), respec-
tively.
To produce the collision in h(·), the attacker finds 2n2/2 collisions in h1(·)
using the multi-collision attack in time complexity of O(n2/2 · 2
n1/2) calls to
h1(·). These colliding messages produce 2
n2/2 messages with the same output of
h1(·), and by the birthday paradox, we expect also one collision in the value of
3 We note that the Joux showed that the result is extendible to concatenation of
several iterative hash functions as well.
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h2(·). This collision is also a collision of h(·) itself which was found using about
O(n2/2 · 2
n1/2) calls to the compression function of h1(·) and O(n2/2 · 2
n2/2)
calls to the compression function of h2(·) (after taking into consideration that
the resulting values are of n2/2 blocks each).
It is easy to see that for each additional compression function which is con-
catenated, we need to produce 2ni/2 collisions for the previous hash functions.
This can be done efficiently by starting from the already found collision, and
transforming it into a multi-collision in a similar manner. The time complexity
of the attack in the case of k hash functions is(
k∏
i=2
nk
)
·
(
k∑
i=1
2nk/2
)
2.3 Joux’s Pre-image Attack on Concatenated Hash Functions
Another interesting result found in [9] is an algorithm for finding pre-images for
concatenated hash functions. For the case of two hash functions there is a special
algorithm, but we shall give the more general algorithm here.
Let IVi be the initialization vector of hi(·). The attacker starts by finding
two message blocks s01 and s
1
1 such that IV1 = h(IV1, s
0
1) = h(IV1, s
1
1).
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Now examine h2(·). The attacker then looks for two sequences of message
blocks s02, s
1
2 (with the same length) of message blocks taken from {s
0
1, s
1
1} each
time such that IV2 = h2(IV2, s
0
2) and IV2 = h2(IV2, s
1
2). We note that both
sequences satisfy that IV1 = h1(IV1, s
0
2) and IV1 = h1(IV1, s
1
2), due to the
way they were constructed. Each new hash function hi(·) requires finding two
sequences based on the two sequences found for hi−1(·) such that hi(·) produces
a fix-point.
Now given h(x) = y = (y1, y2, . . . , hk), the attacker searches for a message
block B for which h1(IV1, B) = y1. Once such a value B is found, the attacker
searches for a sequence s of the blocks {s01, s
1
1} such that h2(IV2, {s
0
1, s
1
1}
+||B) =
y2, and continue in that manner, until she knows how to reach from IVi to
the corresponding yi for all i’s. Then, the attacker just fixes the lengths of the
messages (using the fact that the sequences produce fix-points). We note that
there is no need to find fix-points for hk(·).
There is an important technical aspect following the Merkle-Damg˚ard strength-
ening. The block B should contain the encoding of the message length, and the
length of the message is not necessarily known in advance. However, the length
of B can be estimated in advance (due to the number of concatenations expected
for each hash function). Moreover, in the worst case, a different block B can be
chosen if the need arises.
The time complexity of the attack for k hash functions is 2 · 2n1 + 2 · n2 ·
2n2 + . . .+2
∏k−1
i=2 ni · 2
nk−1 for finding the fix-points, and 2n1 + (n2 +1) · 2
n2 +
4 We note that such an s01 and s
1
1 does not necessarily exist, but in that case, one can
treat them as made of two (or more) blocks. Another possibility is to fix a first block
Mˆ and concatenate it before all messages, thus, changing the value of IV1 into a
different value for which such pre-images may exist.
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. . . + (1 +
∏k
i=2 ni) · 2
nk for the final phase of identifying B and the number of
times each fix-point is to be used.
2.4 The Long 2nd Pre-image Attack
It was widely believed by the cryptographic community that the security proof
of the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction applies also to second pre-image attacks.
However, Dean [6] noticed that this is not true for long messages if the compres-
sion function has easy to find fix-points. His observations were later generalized
by Kelsey and Schneier that used the multi-collision technique to replace the
need of easily found fix-points [11].
A simplified variant of the attack is as follows: consider a long message
M = M1M2 . . .Ml that is processed using h(·), a Merkle-Damg˚ard hash func-
tion, when the message length is not padded (i.e., without the Merkle-Damg˚ard
strengthening). An attacker that wishes to construct a message M∗ such that
h(M) = h(M∗) can randomly select messages M ′ until h(M ′) equals to any
of the l chaining values found during the computation of h(M). Once such an
instance is found, the attacker can concatenate to M ′ the message blocks of
M that are hashed starting from the given chaining value, resulting in M∗ s.t.
h(M) = h(M∗). This attack is foiled by the Merkle-Damg˚ard strengthening, as
the message length is padded, changing the last block that enters the compres-
sion function.
Dean proposed to use to use fix-points to overcome this problem [6]. Assume
that the compression function C(·) is such that finding fix-points is easy, i.e.,
it is easy to find many (h, M) pairs satisfying h = C(h, M). This is the case
for the Davies-Meyer construction that takes a block cipher E that accept n-bit
plaintexts (chaining values) and m-bit keys (message blocks) and sets
hi = C(hi−1, M) = EM (hi−1)⊕ hi−1.
For such a compression function it is easy to find fix-points by computing h =
E−1M (0) for randomly selected messages M .
Given these easily found fix-points Dean’s attack is as follows:
1. Find a set O(2n/2) fix-points denoted by A = {(h, m)}.
2. Select a set of O(2n/2) one block messages, and compute their chaining value
denoted by B = {C(IV, m˜)}.
3. Once a collision between a chaining value and a fix-point, i.e., between chain-
ing values in A and in B, is found, the previous attack is repeated (i.e., trying
to add blocks that cause the same chaining values as the original message).
Once such a message is found, it is easy to expand the number of blocks in the
message to the appropriate length by repeating the fix-point as many times as
needed. The time complexity of Dean’s attack is O(2n/2) calls for the compres-
sion function, O(2n/2) queries for the fix-points oracle, and O(2n−r compression
function calls to find a second pre-image for a 2r + 1 block message.
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Kelsey and Schneier transformed the attack to the case were fix-points are
not easily found. While Dean’s expandable message could be extended by a
concatenation of one message block, in their attack they use the multi-collision
technique to produce an expandable message. They replace the first two steps
in Dean’s attack in the following procedure. In each iteration 1 ≤ i ≤ t a
collision between a one block message and a 2i−1 + 1 block message is found.
This procedure finds a chaining value that can be reached by messages of lengths
between t and 2t + t− 1 blocks. Then, from this chaining value the third step of
Dean’s attack is executed, and the length of the found message is controlled by
the expandable prefix.
The time complexity of the long messages pre-image attack is (2t+2t+1)·2n/2
compression function calls for generating the expandable message, and then 2n−r
to find a colliding chaining value with a message of length 2r + t.
2.5 The Herding Attack
Kelsey and Kohno have observed that it is possible to perform a time-memory
tradeoff for several instances of pre-image attacks [10]. In their attack, an at-
tacker commits to a public digest value that corresponds to some meaningful
message, e.g., a prediction of the outcome of NIST’s hash function competition.
After the announcement of the result, the attacker publishes a message that has
the pre-published digest value and contains the correct information along with
some suffix.
The attack is based on selecting the digest value carefully, helping the at-
tacker to perform a pre-image attack on this value. The main idea behind this
attack is to store T = 2t possible chaining values hi for which the attacker
knows how to reach the published digest value hf . From each such chaining
value, O(2n/2−t/2+1/2) one block message are hashed, resulting in collisions be-
tween pairs of chaining values and messages (hi, mj). The attacker continues
iteratively to find collisions between the new chaining values, until the attacker
finds the final collision. These values (and the corresponding messages) are called
a diamond structure, as presented in Figure 2.5.
The attacker then publishes the last chaining value as a target. When trying
to find a pre-image to this target, the attacker needs to perform only O(2n−t)
operations until finding a message that has a chaining value among the 2t original
values.
We note that unlike the previous attacks that require long messages, this
attack appends relatively short suffix (about t blocks) to the “real” message.
We also note, that the total time complexity of the attack is about O(2n/2+t/2)
off-line operations for the first step of the attack (which is the most time con-
suming5) and O(2n−t) online operations for the second step. For t = n/3 the
overall time complexity of this attack is O(22n/3) for finding a pre-image.
5 Each new step requires about
√
2 times more messages and has twice as little chaining
values.
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Fig. 1. A Diamond Structure
We note that [10] contains also an elongated version that uses long messages.
In this version, from each starting chaining value, a message of 2r blocks is com-
pressed. Thus, the linking message has 2t+r possible chaining values as targets.
In exchange, to compensate for the unknown length, in the online phase of the
attack, the attacker first generates an expandable message, and only then tries to
generate a linking message. This approach increases the pre-computation phase’s
complexity by a factor of 2t+r more compression function calls, in exchange of
reducing the online phase to O(2n−t−r) operations.
3 Extending Joux’s Attacks on Concatenated Hashing
Schemes
3.1 Motivation
Due to the recent attacks on specific hash functions, as well as the generic attacks
on the iterated Merkle-Damg˚ard construction, various fortifications to Merkle-
Damg˚ard were suggested. Some suggestions deal with pre-processing of the mes-
sage, but as shown in [8], as long as the each bit is used a finite number of times,
Joux’s multi-collision attack still works.
A different approach was taken in [7]. In this approach, in order to add
protection against the specific attacks on hash functions (specifically collision
attacks that use more than one block as those in [1, 2, 15–18]), the chaining
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value is composed of several values. Several variants were suggested, including:
3C((cv1, cv2), Mi) = (C(cv1, Mi), cv2 ⊕ C(cv1, Mi)),
3CG((cv1, cv2), Mi) = (C(cv1, Mi), f(cv2, C(cv1, Mi))),
where C is the underlying compression function, cvi are the chaining values and
f is some function. That way the time of the compression function is not greatly
increased, and the current multi-block attacks are harder to implement.
As noted in [7], this suggestion is not secure against Joux’s multi-collision
attack, but it’s expected to be more secure against the herding and the long
message second pre-image attacks. The authors claim that this is under the
assumption that the attacker wishes to attack the entire construction simulta-
neously, while it is obvious that an attacker might attack each chaining value
independently (as noted in a comment due to John Kelsey).
3.2 The Settings
Following the 3C family, we have decided to investigate iterated hash functions
h(·) such that their compression function can be described as:
C((cv1, cv2, . . . , cvk), Mi) = (c1(cv1, Mi), c2(cv1, cv2, Mi), c3(cv1, cv2, cv3, Mi) . . .),
where ci are compression functions. We note that the fact that c2(·) accepts cv1
and Mi, allows it to use any intermediate value (or final value) produced during
the computation of c1(cv1, Mi). This scenario corresponds to several data paths
which are ordered such that each data path affects only data paths with a larger
index.
We shall assume without loss of generality that ci(·) all have the same block
size (for sake of simplicity), as otherwise, we can discuss a block size which is
the least common multiplier of all block sizes. We also denote the length of the
chaining value cvi by ni. We shall assume that ni is even (the results for odd
values of ni can be easily derived from the even case).
We shall start by giving the exact algorithms for Joux’s attacks in this case,
as the multi-collision is the basic step used in our generalized herding attack.
3.3 Extending Joux’s Multi-Collision Attack
The extended algorithm is very similar to the original algorithm proposed by
Joux in [9]. The only difference is during the computations related to ci(·) for
i ≥ 2 where the information from the previous functions is included.
The following algorithm deals with the case of C((cv1, cv2), Mi) = (c1(cv1, Mi), c2(cv1, cv2, Mi))
with initial values (IV1, IV2), and can be easily extended to any number of com-
pression functions:
1. Denote cv01 = IV1.
2. For i = 1, . . . , n2/2:
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(a) Find two message blocksM0i andM
1
i such that c1(cvi, M
0
i ) = c1(cvi, M
1
i ),
and set cvi+1 = c1(cvi, M
0
i ).
3. For all 2n2/2 messages of the form M e1e2...en2/2
def
= M e11 ||M
e2
2 || . . . ||M
en2/2
en2/2/2
for ei ∈ {0, 1}, compute c2(cv1, cv2, M
e1e2...en2/2).
4. By the birthday paradox we expect a collision in the computed hash values
of c2(·) while we are assured to have a collision in the output of c1(·).
The time complexity of the attack is n2/2 · 2
n1/2 applications of c1(·) on one
message blocks, and an additional 2n2/2 applications of c2(·) on messages of n2/2
blocks. The total time complexity is n2/2 · (2
n1/2 +2n2/2) compression function
calls, which is only linearly n2/2 times worse than the number of calls required
to generate a collision in c1(·) or in c2(·).
The time complexity of this attack for k compression functions with respec-
tive output lengths of n1, n2, . . . nk is:[
k∏
i=2
(ni
2
)]
·
[
k∑
i=1
(
2ni/2
)]
.
This work factor as the same as for regular concatenated hash functions.
3.4 Extending Joux’s Pre-image Attack
As before, Joux’s pre-image attack can be easily adapted to the family of hash
functions that we study. The following algorithm finds pre-images in hash func-
tions of the form of C((cv1, cv2), Mi) = (c1(cv1, Mi), c2(cv1, cv2, Mi)) with initial
values (IV1, IV2), and can be easily extended to any number of compression func-
tions. Let (y1, y2) be the required hash value, apply the following algorithm:
1. Find two messages M0 and M1 such that c1(IV1, M0) = c1(IV1, M1) = IV1.
2. Find B, a message block which encode a message length of n2 + 1 blocks,
such that c1(IV1, B) = y1.
3. For each of the 2n2 possible messagesM e1,e2,...,en2 = Me1 ||Me2 || . . . ||Men2 ||B
for ei ∈ {0, 1}, compute c2(IV1, IV2, M
e1,e2,...,en2 ). Output M e1,e2,...,en2 for
which c2(IV1, IV2, M
e1,e2,...,en2 ) = y2.
The time complexity of the above algorithm is expected to be 2 · 2n1 calls to
c1(·) for finding M0 and M1. An additional 2
n1 calls for c1(·) are expected for
finding B. Finally, 2n2 calls for c2(·) with blocks of length n2 + 1 are expected
for the final step of the attack. Thus, the total number of compression functions
calls is:
2 · 2n1 + 2n1 + (n2 + 1) · 2
n2 = 3 · 2n1 + (n2 + 1) · 2
n1 .
For hash functions with more than two compression functions, we use the
above algorithm to find fix-points (without B) of all but last compression func-
tions, and then find the message block B. The time complexity in this case
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is:
2 · 2n1 + 2n1 + 2 · n2 · 2
n2 + (n2 + 1) · 2
n2 + 2 · n3 · n2 · 2
n3 + (n3 · n2 + 1) · 2
n3 + . . .
+ 2 ·
(
k−1∏
i=2
ni
)
· 2nk−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
a fix-point for ck−1(·)
+
[(
k−1∏
i=2
ni
)
+ 1
]
· 2nk−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre-image for ck−1(·)
+
[(
k∏
i=2
ni
)
+ 1
]
· 2nk
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre-image for ck(·)
For comparison, we remind the reader that a naive approach to find a pre-image
for such a hash function would be 2n for n =
∑k
i=1 ni.
4 Extending the Herding Attack
The extension of the herding attack is a non trivial operation. The herding attack
stores several starting points, and then tries to reach one of them. This data-
memory trade-off approach is very useful when the number of stored starting
points is somewhat proportional to the number of possible chaining values. By
storing 2t starting points, the linking message requires 2n−t trials (on average)
to get connected to one of these values, where n =
∑k
i=1 ni.
In the case of concatenated hash functions, if we want to store the same
relative number of points, then one does not need to exploit the concatenation,
however this would increase the memory complexity (and the pre-processing
time) significantly. This fact becomes illustrated once the attacker has to find a
linking message that fits all the intermediate values simultaneously.
Our algorithm is based on converging to the pre-computed paths of chaining
values, one coordinate of the chaining values at a time. To perform the first con-
vergences, we use a simple diamond structure as in the original herding attack.
Then, the second coordinate is handled, by maintaining the knowledge of the
first coordinate. This is done by using messages for the second diamond which
are composed of multi-collisions in the first coordinate. Once the second coor-
dinate converged to our known path, we can handle the next one, again using
multi-collisions in the first two coordinates to maintain our knowledge of them.
There is another technical problem — while the first linking message to the
first diamond construction is relatively unrestricted (besides its length), once
we fix the first coordinate of the hash function, we cannot use another chaining
message without taking into consideration the coordination that was fixed. Thus,
it might seem that for the following compression functions we may need to store
all possible starting points (of the compression function that we currently work
with). This approach works, but is far from optimal.
We solve this problem by adding a series of linking blocks (again, based
on multi-collisions), that ensures that independent of the chaining value in the
second coordinate just at the end of the first diamond structure, we shall find one
of the starting points to the second diamond. The process can then be repeated
as many times as needed. Figure 4 depicts the structure for the case of two
compression functions.
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Fig. 2. The Main Idea Behind a Diamond Structure for a Hash Function of the Form
h(x) = h1(x)||h2(x).
Thus, the herding pre-processing algorithm (given for the case of two hash
functions) is as follows:
1. Constructing the first diamond: Choose 2t chaining values for c1(·), and
build from them the diamond structure of the herding attack. Denote the
resulting chaining value by cv01 .
2. Constructing a link between the diamonds: For i = 0, . . . , (n2− t)− 1
find two message blocks M0i and M
1
i such that c1(cv
i
1, M
0
i ) = c1(cv
i
1, M
1
i ) =
cvi+11 .
3. Constructing the second diamond:
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(a) Choose 2t chaining values xi for c2(·).
(b) Generate 2n2/2−t/2+1/2 multi-collisions in c1(·). For i = n2 − t . . . , (n2 −
t) + (n2/2 − t/2 − 1/2) find two message blocks M
0
i and M
1
i such that
c1(cv
i
1, M
0
i ) = c1(cv
i
1, M
1
i ) = cv
i+1
1 .
(c) For each chaining value of c2(·) try all possible sequences of messages
M en2−ten2−t+1...e(3/2)(n2−t)−1/2 = M
en2−t
n2−t ||M
en2−t+1
n2−t+1
|| . . . ||M
e(3/2)(n2−t)−1/2
(3/2)(n2−t)−1/2
.
(d) From the generated 2t−1 chaining values for c2(·), repeat Steps 2–3 with
longer multi-collisions (to compensate for the smaller number of points)
according to the diamond generation algorithm.
4. Denote the the resulting digest value by (cv1, cv2).
5. Concatenate a message block containing the right message padding for the
Merkle-Damg˚ard strengthening (if needed). Store the message block, and
output the digest value as the target message value.
The online computational phase is as follows (again, given for the case of two
hash functions):
1. Choose 2n1−t messages and try to obtain one of the 2t starting points for
c1(·).
2. Once such a message is found, search over the 2n2−t combinations of {M0i , M
1
i }
for i = 0, . . . n2 − t − 1 of length n2 − t, until one of the 2
t starting points
stored in the second diamond structure is found.
3. Use the stored information in the diamond structure to obtain the full mes-
sage.
The pre-processing phase requires 2n1/2+t/2 for the generation of the first
diamond structure. Then a set of 2n2−t multi-collisions are generated, in time
complexity of (n2 − t) · 2
n1/2. In the generation of the second diamond, we
first generate n2/2 − t/2 + 1/2 multi-collisions in c1(·), in time complexity of
(n2/2− t/2+ 1/2) · 2
n1/2. Then, the diamond algorithm is called again, but this
time using messages of n2/2− t/2+1/2 blocks (rather than of one block). Thus,
the time complexity of this step is (n2/2− t/2) · 2
n2/2+t/2.
During the process of generating the second diamond we slowly increase
the length of the processed message block. This has almost no affect on the
time complexity of the proper diamond structure generation, but it requires
generating more multi-collisions. The total number of multi-collisions is
(n2 − t)/2 + 1/2 + (n2 − t)/2 + 3/2 + . . .+ n2 = (n2 + (n2 − t)/2 + 1/2)/2 · (t + 1)/2 ≈
(3n2 − t)/4 · t/2 = 3/8n2 · t− t
2/8.
Thus, the total number of calls to the compression functions in the pre-
processing phase is 2n1/2+t/2 + t/8 · (3n2 − t) · 2
n1/2 + (n2/2 − t/2) · 2
n2+t/2 ≈
2n1/2+t/2 + (n2/2− t/2) · 2
n2/2+t/2.
It is sufficient to store in each layer of the second diamond structure the index
of the message sequence that leads to the collision between the c2(·) chaining
values. Thus, the memory complexity of the second diamond structure is similar
to the memory required to store such a diamond structure for a hash function
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of n2 output bits (up to some small memory required for storing M
0
i and M
1
i
for the respective i values) .
The online phase requires 2n1−t calls for c1(·) (we note that computing c2 is
not necessary before we find a message that achieves one of the required starting
points). Then, the attacker has to try 2n2−t calls to c2(·) with messages of length
n2−t. Thus, the total time complexity of the online phase is 2
n1−t+(n2−t)·2
n2−t
compression function calls.
For comparison, applying the basic herding attack without using the concate-
nated nature, the attack would require 22s · 2(n1+n2)/2 calls for the joint com-
pression function in the pre-processing phase (to generate 2s starting points),
and 2(n1+n2)−s calls to find the linking message.
For multiple number of hash functions, one has to use in the pre-processing
phase the multi-collision approach that was used in Section 3.3. The correspond-
ing time complexity of the attack for k compression functions in that case is
roughly
2n1/2+t/2 + (n2/2− t/2) · 2
n2/2+t/2 + . . .+
(
k−1∏
i=2
ni/2
)
· (nk − t/2) · 2
nk/2+t/2
The online computational phase is only slightly altered, and has the total time
complexity of 2n1−t + (n2 − t) · 2
n2−t + (n3 − t) · n2 · 2
n3−t + . . . + (nk − t) ·(∏k−1
i=2 ni
)
· 2nk−t compression function calls.
5 Summary
In this work we have shown that the herding attack can be extended to cases
where there is dependence between concatenated compression functions, as long
as the flow of dependence is in one direction. Following our findings along with
Joux’s initial observations we recommend hash functions designers to have good
diffusion in case they prefer to use several data paths (to reduce implementation
costs).
A problem that is still open is the extension of the long second pre-image
attack to such hash functions. Another open problem is how to deal with the case
where two data paths affect each other, as suggested by many recent proposals.
References
1. Eli Biham, Rafi Chen, Near-Collisions of SHA-0, Advances in Cryptology, pro-
ceedings of CRYPTO 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3152, pp. 290–305,
Springer-Verlag, 2004.
2. Eli Biham, Rafi Chen, Antoine Joux, Patrick Carribault, Christophe Lemuet,
William Jalby, Collisions of SHA-0 and Reduced SHA-1, Advances in Cryptol-
ogy, proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3621,
pp. 36–57, 2005.
13
3. Florent Chabaud, Antoine Joux, Differential Collisions in SHA-0, Advances in
Cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO 1998, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
1462, pp. 56–71, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
4. Don Coppersmith, Another Birthday Attack, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings
of CRYPTO 1985, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 218, pp. 14–17, Springer-
Verlag, 1986.
5. Ivan Damg˚ard, A Design Principle for Hash Functions, Advances in Cryptology,
proceedings of CRYPTO 1989, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 435, pp. 416–
427, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
6. Richared D. Dean, Formal Aspects of Mobile Code Security., Ph.D. dissertation,
Princeton University, 1999.
7. Praveen Gauravaram, William Millan, Ed Dawson, Matt Henricksen, Jaunma
Gonza´les Nieto, Kapali Viswanathan, Constructing Secure Hash Functions
by Enhancing Merkle-Damg˚ard Construction (Full Version), available online at
http://www.isi.qut.edu.au/research/publications/technical/qut-isi-tr-2006-013.pdf.
8. Jonathan J. Hoch, Adi Shamir, Breaking the ICE — Finding Multicollisions in
Iterated Concatenated and Expanded (ICE) Hash Functions, preproceedings of Fast
Software Encryption 2006, pp. 199–214, 2006.
9. Antoine Joux, Multicollisions in Iterated Hash Functions, Advances in Cryptology,
proceedings of CRYPTO 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3152, pp. 306–
316, Springer-Verlag, 2004.
10. John Kelsey, Tadayoshi Kohno, Herding Hash Functions and the Nostradamus At-
tack, preproceedings of Cryptographic Hash Workshop, held in NIST, Gaithers-
burg, Maryland, 2005.
11. John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, Second Preimages on n-Bit Hash Functions for Much
Less than 2n, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 3494, pp. 474–490, Springer-Verlag, 2005.
12. Ralph C. Merkle, Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems, UMI Research
press, 1982.
13. Ralph C. Merkle, One Way Hash Functions and DES, Advances in Cryptology,
proceedings of CRYPTO 1989, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 435, pp. 428–
446, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
14. US National Bureau of Standards, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Pro-
cessing Standards Publications No. 180-2, 2002.
15. Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, Hui Chen, Xiuyuan Yu, Cryptanalysis
of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings
of EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3494, pp. 1–18, 2005.
16. Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, Hongbo Yu, Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1,
Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO 2005, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science 3621, pp. 17–36, 2005.
17. Xiaoyun Wang, Hongbo Yu, How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions, Ad-
vances in Cryptology, proceedings of EUROCRYPT 2005, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science 3494, pp. 19–35, 2005.
18. Xiaoyun Wang, Hongbo Yu, Yiqun Lisa Yin, Efficient Collision Search Attacks on
SHA-0, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO 2005, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 3621, pp. 1–16, 2005.
14
